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HERMENEUTICS AND CONTRACT DEFAULT RULES:  
AN ESSAY ON LIEBER AND CORBIN 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham ∗ 
 
 
      The most provocative debate in contemporary contract law scholarship concerns default rule 
analysis.1 Dozens of law review articles have been devoted to this puzzle regarding the manner 
in which courts do or should fill gaps in incomplete contracts.2 The timing and course of this 
debate might have been very different, however, except for an accident of intellectual history. 
 
      The eminent but neglected nineteenth-century scholar Francis Lieber elaborated a 
comprehensive solution to the default rules puzzle by first distinguishing the judicial acts of 
contract interpretation and construction, and then by developing principles of construction with 
which to choose default rules.3 The eminent and venerated twentieth-century treatise writer 
Arthur Corbin knew about Lieber's enterprise, but in his treatise on contracts, dismissed Lieber's 
distinction in a footnote and never explored the rest of Lieber's hermeneutics.4 Corbin could have 
addressed Lieber in his text, however, and if he had, much of the professorial energy expended in 
the prevailing default rules debate might have been conserved. 
 
      Lieber and Corbin both understood contract interpretation to mean the act of determining 
whether the expressions of a contract (in acts or words) speak to a dispute and, if so, what 
meaning the parties to a contract intended to be assigned to their expressions.  Lieber defined 
                                                 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.  Thanks 
to Bill Bratton, Michael Herz, Arthur Jacobson, Paul Shupack, and Stewart Sterk. 
1 Since there are virtually no other debates in contemporary contract law scholarship, see Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Interpretation and the Optimal Choice of Legal 
Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 & nn.3 - 4 (1992), the adjective “most” in this sentence may be 
meaningless, yet the debate is provocative. 
2 E.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the 
Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990); Charles J. Goetz & 
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between 
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (1985); Symposium, Default Rules 
and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1994). 
3 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 
AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS 43 -137 (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed., St. Louis, 
F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880) (1837), republished in 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883, 1921-88 (1995).  
[In subsequent citations, the page number as it appears in the republication will be given in 
brackets following the page citation to the third edition.] 
4 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS s 534, at 13 n.11 (1960). 
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contract construction to mean the act of determining how a contract should be treated when 
either the expressions do not speak to a dispute or they speak to it in a manner inconsistent with 
some superior principle.  He then developed a set of hermeneutic principles that closely linked 
the acts of interpretation and construction in a dedication to understanding and implementing the 
“spirit and true import” of the expressions.5  
 
      Corbin broadened Lieber's definition of contract construction to mean the act of determining 
what legal consequences are to follow from either the apprehension of the meaning of the 
expressions in a contract or a determination that the expressions do not speak to a dispute.  
Corbin's definition of construction broadened Lieber's definition by eroding the close link Lieber 
had attempted to maintain between interpretation and construction and using the label 
“construction” to capture all judicial determinations of the legal operation of a contract.  Corbin 
may have done this to facilitate the development of a descriptively accurate framework that 
would accommodate the many ways in which contract law rules can or do yield results in 
conflict with the intentions of parties as revealed in interpreting their expressions.  While so 
adapting Lieber's distinction was doctrinally sound, after doing so, Corbin gave no further 
consideration to Lieber's principles of construction, condemning them to the dustbins of 
intellectual history and contract law theory. 
 
      Though Lieber's work was broad and ambitious -- reaching all fields of legal analysis -- it 
was rather limited with respect to the law of contracts specifically.  Given also that Lieber was 
not formally trained in the common law, it is not surprising that his work would require 
modification for application to the law of contracts.  Even so, Lieber's principles of construction 
provide an analytical framework with which to understand and guide the way judges choose 
rules that actually or potentially conflict with the intentions of parties in contract disputes.  
Because Lieber's principles constitute foundational ideas, a return to them may be both efficient 
in conserving intellectual energy and profitable in providing fresh insights into the problems to 
which the ideas apply.6 By reviewing the distinction between interpretation and construction as 
Corbin adapted it from Lieber in Part I and then showing how Lieber's principles of construction 
bear directly on the prevailing default rules debate in Part II, this Essay invites a return to those 
foundational ideas and the addition of hermeneutics to the default rules debate.7  
 
                                                 
5 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 53 [at 1927]. 
6 Lieber's hermeneutic principles constitute the first full elaboration of the distinction between 
contract interpretation and construction, although the practical underpinnings of the distinction 
date to Lord Mansfield's statement of constructive conditions of exchange in Kingston v. 
Preston, reported in Jones v. Barkley, 99 Eng. Rep. 434, 437-38 (K.B. 1781) (reversing early 
common law rule that promises not made expressly conditional on the prior performance of a 
counterparty's performance were independent so that each party could sue to enforce a 
counterparty's promise even if that party had not itself performed its side of the bargain). 
7 Contract law scholars outside the default rules debate may also profit from a return to Lieber's 
foundational ideas because Lieber's illumination of the distinction between interpretation and 
construction may justify its rejuvenation.  See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS s 7.7, at 496 
- 97 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that the distinction is too difficult to maintain in practice); see also 
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS s 3 -7, at 160 (3d ed. 1987) (same). 
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I. Interpretation and Construction 
 
      Lieber and Corbin shared basic views with respect to the problem of interpretation, though 
even Corbin's articulation of this part of the dichotomy was more precisely tailored for 
application specifically to the law of contracts.  For Lieber, interpretation “can only take place, if 
the text conveys some meaning.”8 And if a text does convey some relevant meaning that can be 
interpreted to resolve a dispute arising under it, then no question of construction arises.  Corbin 
agreed that interpretation relates to understanding “ language itself -- to the symbols (the words 
and acts) of expression.”9 He did not agree, however, that the step of interpretation alone could 
resolve a contract dispute, except to the extent that interpretation led to the conclusion that no 
contract existed. 
 
      Corbin denied that a court would ever reach the stage of construction without first having 
decided, in the act of interpretation, that a contract had been formed.  Instead, expressions must 
first be interpreted to determine whether the elements of a contract -- offer, acceptance, and 
consideration, for example -- exist.  That determination requires the interpretation of, and that 
meaning be given to, the parties' expressions before ascertaining their legal operation.  If a court 
decides in this process of interpretation that a purported expression of an offer, for example, is 
instead only a quotation of prices and the recipient should have understood that, then “it has no 
legal operation and the recipient got no power of acceptance. . . . In [such a case] the problem of 
‘construction’ of a contract [does not] arise.”10  
 
      Thus Corbin both sharpens and limits Lieber's conception of interpretation by saying first 
that interpretation will be dispositive in cases where there is no contract, and second, that 
interpretation alone cannot be conclusive in resolving a contract dispute where there is a 
contract.  In effect, Corbin tailors Lieber's first part of the dichotomy for application specifically 
to contract law: the step of interpretation consists of ascertaining the meaning of the parties' 
expressions and includes the threshold determination of whether a contract exists.  All steps 
beyond ascertaining the meaning of expressions and the determination that a contract exists 
involve acts of construction to ascertain the legal effect of that meaning. 
 
      The critical differences between Lieber's and Corbin's distinction therefore begin with the 
circumstances under which one moves from interpretation to construction.  In addition to 
insisting that one should not move to construction unless interpretation is insufficient to resolve a 
dispute, Lieber identified four circumstances in which a judge would need to move (and be 
justified in moving) from the step of interpretation to the step of construction: when the contract 
is “inadequate[ ] . . . [to address] cases which human wisdom could not foresee”;11 when the 
contract makes “imperfect provision . . . [for cases] which might . . . have been provided for”;12 
when the contract contains contradictions;13 and when the contract text must be subordinated to 
                                                 
8 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 43 [at 1921]. 
9 CORBIN, supra note 4, s 534, at 8. 
10 Id. at 10 -11. 
11 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 44 [at 1922]. 
12 Id. (discussing this concept in terms of politics). 
13 Id. 
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some “superior authority,” which Lieber characterized narrowly as consisting of certain 
fundamental issues of morality.14  
 
      For Lieber, construction means “the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie 
beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known from and given in the text -- 
conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the text.”15 Thus Lieber draws 
one of his two “proper principles” of construction: “construction signifies the discovery of the 
spirit, principles, and rules that ought to guide us according to the text.”16 In constructing texts of 
inferior authority, moreover, “the problem . . . is to cause that which is to be construed to agree 
with” the superior principle at stake.17 In that case, according to Lieber's second “proper 
principle” of construction, “construction is the causing of the text to agree and harmonize with 
the demands or principles of superior authority.”18  
 
      Lieber is thus emphatic about linking the act of construction to the spirit or true import of the 
text.  Thus, he declares, that 
 
[i]t is . . . construction alone which saves us . . . from sacrificing the spirit of a text 
or the object, to the letter of the text, or to the means by which that object was to 
be obtained.  And, without construction . . . texts containing rules of actions . . . 
would . . . [often] become fearfully destructive to the best and wisest intentions 
[and], frequently, produce the very opposite of what it was purposed to effect.19  
 
      In addition to broadening the circumstances in which construction is necessary, Corbin also 
disagreed with Lieber's thesis that the act of construction must bear some close relation to the 
spirit or true import of the contract text.  On the contrary, for Corbin, the act of construction has 
no necessary connection with the intention of the parties.  Thus: 
 
[w]hen a court gives a construction to the contract as that is affected by events 
subsequent to its making and not foreseen by the parties, it is departing very far 
from mere interpretation of their symbols of expression, although even then it 
may claim somewhat erroneously to be giving effect to the “intention” of the 
parties.20 More generally, “[w]hen a court is filling gaps in the terms of an 
agreement with respect to matters that the parties did not have in contemplation 
and as to which they had no intention to be expressed, the judicial process should 
not be called interpretation.”21 That step in the judicial process should not, and 
indeed cannot, be called interpretation precisely because it has no necessary 
connection with the intentions of the parties, and in cases of unforeseen 
                                                 
14 Id. at 45, 47 [at 1922-23]. 
15 Id. at 44 [at 1921]. 
16 Id. at 46 [at 1923]. 
17 Id. at 47 [at 1923]. 
18 Id. at 45 [at 1922]. 
19 Id. 
20 CORBIN, supra note 4, s 534, at 9. 
21 Id. at 11. 
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contingencies, cannot possibly have any connection with those intentions. 
 
      Consider Corbin's example of a contract providing expressly that goods to be bought and 
sold must meet with the personal satisfaction of the buyer.22 As a matter of interpretation, this 
phrase raises no uncertainty for either Corbin or Lieber.  By this phrase, the parties mean that the 
buyer is to be satisfied, personally.  Unless one contrives to see some superior principle of 
morality at stake in this clause, Lieber would decide that the step of interpretation is as far as a 
judge would need to go.  In contrast, whether or not the clause implicates any superior principle 
of morality, Corbin would still insist that the step of construction remained to be taken.  For it is 
not only that all judicial steps beyond ascertaining the meaning of words in a contract are acts of 
construction, but also that acts of construction are required in all cases where the act of 
interpretation shows there is a contract. 
 
      Corbin's next step into the act of construction, moreover, is not constrained, as it is for 
Lieber, by an obedience to the spirit or true import of the text.  Thus where public policy dictates 
that a certain contract clause be understood in a certain way, the spirit or true import of the text is 
irrelevant.  Corbin would therefore cheerfully go along with a judicial construction declaring that 
the legal operation of a personal satisfaction clause means the satisfaction of a reasonable person.  
Lieber, in contrast, would object that this act is not consonant with the spirit or true import of the 
language.  In other words, whereas Lieber was utterly concerned that construction is necessary to 
avoid impairing the parties' intentions, Corbin insists that construction is necessary precisely to 
enable judges to impair the parties' intentions in appropriate cases. 
 
      Consider this example from Lieber.23 Thomas Cumming prepares his will naming T. 
Cumming, his English nephew, as a beneficiary.  At the time Thomas Cumming prepared the 
will, however, and unbeknownst to him, the nephew was dead and that nephew's son, another T. 
Cumming, had been born and was alive.  In resolving the (inevitable) dispute over the will, 
according to Lieber, two steps are necessary.  As a matter of interpretation, “according to the 
meaning [Thomas] attached to [the words], he cannot have meant T. Cumming the youngest.”24 
That being so, “construction becomes necessary [[[because] interpretation is insufficient” to 
resolve the dispute.25 As a matter of construction, Lieber therefore asks, “how shall we draw our 
conclusions and apply them to the subject, which lies beyond the direct expression of the text.”26 
His answer: “elements afforded us by the text will lead us to the just and true conclusion, that 
Thomas Cumming the eldest meant to leave the sum in question to the English branch of his 
family, and that T. Cumming the youngest ought to receive it.”27  
 
      Corbin would disagree with Lieber's analysis.  Whereas Lieber believed that “construction 
                                                 
22 Id. at 13 -14 (citing and criticizing Inman Mfg. Co. v. American Cereal Co., 110 N.W. 287 
(Iowa 1907)). 
23 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 50 -51 [at 1926-27]. 
24 Id. at 51 [at 1926]. 
25 Id. [at 1927]. 
26 Id. [at 1926-27]. 
27 Id. [at 1927]. 
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becomes necessary if interpretation is insufficient,”28 Corbin regarded construction as necessary 
even where interpretation enables a determination of intended meaning.  Construction is deciding 
the legal operation of the contract (or will, in Lieber's example) once the meaning of the words is 
understood.  Lieber's formulation of the interpretation/construction distinction leads him to 
conclude that there is only one choice -- in his will example, Lieber's “construction” is dedicated 
to understanding the testator's intent based on the text.  Corbin understood that Lieber's choice is 
only one of many possible choices (though Lieber's choice seems eminently sound).29 And it is 
making that choice, according to all available legal materials, that constitutes for Corbin the act 
of construction.30 That act has no necessary relationship to the intentions of the parties (or 
testator), though Lieber's formulation insists that it must.31  
 
      Lieber and Corbin both recognized that the lines between the distinction they were drawing 
could sometimes be difficult to maintain.  Thus Corbin noted that interpretation and construction 
are [not] wholly independent of each other.  Just as construction must begin with interpretation . . 
. interpretation will vary with the construction that must follow.  Finding that one interpretation 
of the words will be followed by the enforcement of certain legal effects, we may back hastily 
away from that interpretation and substitute another that will lead to a more desirable result.32 
And Lieber acknowledged that “interpretation and construction must closely approach to one 
another; but still the distinction is clear.”33  
 
      Lieber and Corbin were also each cautious about drawing the distinction between 
interpretation and construction.  Corbin acknowledged that the distinction “is by no means a 
necessary one.”34 Lieber expressed deeper pangs: “It was not without repeatedly weighing the 
subject, that I first ventured upon the distinction between interpretation and construction; for, if 
clear distinction is one of the efficient means to arrive at truth, it is equally true that subtleties 
impede instead of aiding in seizing upon it.”35  
 
      Lieber nevertheless believed he had identified a distinction of potential utility, advertising 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Cf. infra note 95 (use of cy pres doctrine in the “Girard College” case). 
30 See CORBIN, supra note 4, s 534, at 9 n.7 (noting that such “questions are not answered by 
‘interpretation.’  They all involve the ‘legal operation’ of the contract after its meaning has been 
found by interpretation, a legal operation to be determined by long study of the common law, 
equity and statutes.”). 
31 In Corbin's analogous example, a contract provides “We promise to pay ... $40,000” to C and 
“the signatures being thus, ‘A three fifths; B two fifths.”  The first issue is whether A promised 
to pay $40,000 or $24,000 and whether B promised to pay $40,000 or $16,000.  That is an issue 
of interpretation.  If in the act of interpretation one decides that A and B each promised to pay 
$40,000, other issues might arise, including whether C can get a joint judgment for $40,000, two 
separate judgments for $40,000, the effect of releases, death, and so on, all of which are 
questions of construction.  Id. 
32 Id. at 12. 
33 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 53 [at 1928]. 
34 CORBIN, supra note 4, s 534, at 13. 
35 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 49 [at 1925]. 
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that since he had articulated it, “two of our most distinguished lawyers have fully concurred in 
the distinction between the two, and have accepted it” and that as of 1860 the distinction was 
“very generally adopted.”36 Hammond, who edited the 1880 version of Lieber's work on 
hermeneutics, softened this claim: “While [many have adopted the distinction,] it can hardly be 
said to have been generally accepted by legal writers.  The two words are still too often used 
interchangeably . . . .”37 Corbin recognized this as well, noting that the concepts “are often used 
in the same sense”38 and that the distinction “is very often not made.”39  
 
      Corbin may therefore have departed from Lieber's distinction precisely because he had 
noticed that it had not caught fire -- he dismissed Lieber's distinction on the grounds that it was 
“supported by ‘neither common usage nor practical convenience.’ ”40 In contrast, Corbin 
believed that the distinction he drew was of “practical convenience.”41 In particular, Corbin 
justified his formulation of the distinction on two grounds:  “First, there is no identity nor much 
similarity between the process of giving a meaning to words, and the determination by the court 
of their legal operation”;42 and second, it “is consistent with that made in other chapters of 
[Corbin's] treatise and with the usage of the . . . [Restatement].”43 In other words, Corbin was 
seeking to capture, more accurately than Lieber had done, the manner in which courts actually 
decided contracts disputes, thereby promoting the doctrinal coherence of contract law. 
 
      Lieber's formulation distinctly privileged a very broad conception of freedom of contract by 
tying all acts of construction back to the spirit and true import of the parties' expressions.44 But 
such an infinite conception of freedom of contract is hard to reconcile with the common law.  For 
there are numerous rules of contract law, constituting its very fabric, that cannot be changed no 
matter what the parties might say.45 While this was of course already true when Lieber wrote, 
greater invasions upon freedom of contract accelerated in the decades after he developed his 
                                                 
36 Id. at 50 & n.* [at 1925 & n.9]. 
37 Id. at 50 n.5 [at 1926 n.9] (citation omitted). 
38 CORBIN, supra note 4, s 534, at 7. 
39 Id. at 13. 
40 Id. at 13 n.11 (citation omitted). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 13. 
43 Id. 
44 Indeed, Lieber emphasized the special importance of linking the act of construction to the 
spirit and true import of the text in the case of “a compact, or solemn agreement.”  LIEBER, supra 
note 3, at 136 [at 1988]. 
45 See W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 29, 32 (1994): 
[T]here are many laws of contract that cannot be contractually changed: the 
requirements of enforceability -- consideration, promissory estoppel, etc.; the 
parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds; the rules for determining the relative 
rights and duties of assignors, assignees, and third-party beneficiaries; the 
defenses of undue influence, conflict with public policy, unilateral and mutual 
mistake; and many, although not all, of the rules of offer and acceptance.  And the 
changes that can be made in remedies by contract are limited .... 
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distinction.  The proliferation of standard form contracts, the consequent development of the idea 
of contracts of adhesion and the later evolution of the doctrine of unconscionability would 
explode the limits of Lieber's distinction.46 As a master treatise writer and contracts scholar, 
therefore, Corbin formulated a distinction between interpretation and construction that would 
accommodate both the historical background fabric of contract law, as well as contemporary 
assaults upon the abstract primacy of freedom of contract. 
 
      Lieber's implicit embrace of such a strong conception of freedom of contract is a particular 
instance of Professor Carrington's broader point that Lieber, being deeply committed to 
individual rights, sought to understand the judicial role as far more limited than was widely 
believed during the period of Jacksonian populism in which he wrote.47 The close link Lieber 
sought to maintain between interpretation and construction reflects his theory of language that 
words and collections of words contain a unitary meaning capable of being discovered.48 That 
theory in turn can be read to make plausible strong claims of judicial objectivity and legal 
determinacy, for judges simply uncover and then give effect to the meaning of expressions 
according to a fixed set of rules.  As a pioneer of legal realism, Corbin understood the judicial 
role to involve a greater degree of normative discretion than is implied by this way of 
understanding Lieber.  Accordingly, Corbin's rejection of Lieber's distinction between 
interpretation and construction may not only recognize that much of contract law depends on the 
expressions of contracting parties along with the social context in which they acted, but that 
equally critical is the social subsystem of contract law in which judges resolve contract disputes 
between contracting parties.49  
 
II. Principles of Construction 
 
      If Corbin's adaptation of Lieber's distinction between contract interpretation and construction 
offered a more accurate descriptive account of what judges actually do in contracts cases and 
recognized the normative choices inherent in that activity, Lieber's principles of contract 
construction nevertheless offered remarkably prescient prescriptions for the construction process.  
                                                 
46 See Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. 
REV. 833, 834 -38 & n.3 (1964) (elaborating Corbin's distinction between interpretation and 
construction); id. at 855 -59 (discussing contracts of adhesion and doctrine of unconscionability). 
47 See Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the Lieber Revival, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2135 (1995). 
48 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 74 [at 1943]. 
49 A more cynical explanation for the way Corbin formulated the distinction is to recognize how 
it would improve his position in debates with Williston in arguing against rigid adherence to the 
parol evidence rule.  By insisting on a sharp distinction and putting all questions of meaning on 
the side of interpretation, Corbin could apply the parol evidence rule narrowly, at least in terms 
of what information the trier of fact gets to review.  See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of 
Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 189 (1965) (the parol evidence rule 
“has no application in the process of interpretation of a written instrument”).  This is a cynical 
view, however, because Williston adopted a similar distinction (though without Corbin's 
alacrity).  See generally 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS s 602 (3d ed. 1961). 
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Lieber justified the need for such principles:  “For the very reason that construction endeavors to 
arrive at conclusions beyond the absolute sense of the text, and that it is dangerous on this 
account, we must strive the more anxiously to find out safe rules, to guide us on the dangerous 
path.”50  
 
      Corbin may have decided that Lieber's principles of construction were unhelpful because 
they were bound up with the limits of Lieber's underlying distinction.  Or, he may have neglected 
them either because he did not regard the act of judicial construction as “dangerous” in the way 
Lieber suggested, or because he did not regard Lieber's principles as capable of constraining 
judicial discretion.  But it is precisely a concern about that aspect of the judicial role to which 
Lieber's principles may be addressed, and they are not as strictly formal as Corbin's neglect of 
them may be taken to imply.  For when Lieber's principles of construction are applied within 
Corbin's distinction between interpretation and construction, they offer a framework for 
determining how contract law's background rules should operate.  As a result, participants in the 
prevailing default rules debate would profit by examining the number of possible ways that 
Lieber's principles of construction can contribute to the debate, the most general of which I will 
sketch below.51  
 
      For both Corbin and Lieber, the first step a judge must take in resolving a dispute concerning 
the expressions of a contract is to read (or hear) those expressions.  In this step the judge must 
interpret those expressions.52 The judge will determine that the expressions either address the 
dispute in some way or are silent concerning it.  If in this interpretive step the judge determines 
that the expressions are silent with respect to the dispute or imperfectly address it, he must in the 
next step supply terms to fill the gap discovered by interpretation.53  
                                                 
50 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 53 [at 1927-28]. 
51 I leave it to individual scholars to discover the ways in which Lieber's hermeneutics relate 
specifically to their own work, though I note strong points of consonance between Lieber's ideas 
and those of, among others, Randy Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 829 (1992) (Barnett's conventionalist default rules thesis); Steven 
J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 115, 129 (1994) (Burton's notion that default rules are necessary once 
the “authority of a contract” is “exhausted”); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The 
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1818 (1991) (Charny's 
“framework for determining interpretive conventions”); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, 
Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 508 -11 (1989) 
(Craswell's economic approach); and Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate Over Default Rules 
in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 236, 285 - 86 (1994) (Patterson's search for 
legal justifications for default rules). 
52 To be true to Corbin, by “judge,” with respect to questions of fact, I mean equally the jury, as 
the case may be.  See CORBIN, supra note 4. 
53 In glossing over the step of interpretation I do not mean to suggest any simplicity in it (I 
recognize quite the opposite).  I do so because in the default rules context, questions of 
construction dominate, and it is to that end that I am attempting to adapt Lieber's hermeneutics.  
Note though, that Lieber's hermeneutics include principles of interpretation as well, on which 
contract law scholars may also wish to draw. 
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      In the act of supplying a contract term the judge is engaged in an act of construction, as 
Corbin defined it, and in doing so would profit by appealing to Lieber's principles of 
construction.  Lieber classified the legitimate species of construction as close, comprehensive 
and transcendent, and classified as illegitimate a species of construction called extravagant.54 
Close construction is the “ directest possible application of the text, or the principles it involves, 
to new or unprovided cases, or to contradictory parts, in short, to subjects which lie beyond the 
words of the text.”55 Comprehensive construction is “an extensive application of the text, or the 
principles it involves, to new, unprovided, or not sufficiently specified cases or contradictions.”56 
Transcendent construction is “derived from, or founded upon, a principle superior to the text, 
and, nevertheless aims at deciding subjects belonging to the province of that text.”57  
 
       Extravagant construction 
carries the effect of the text beyond its true limits, and, therefore, is not any longer 
genuine construction, as [transcendent construction] becomes of a more and more 
doubtful character the more it approaches to this.  The difference between the two 
is this, that the former remains, in spite of its transcendency, within the spirit of 
the . . . document to be construed; whilst extravagant construction abandons it.58  
 
Here there is an apparent tension in Lieber's principles of construction.  Lieber's definition of 
transcendent construction permits departures from the spirit or true import of the text when it 
conflicts with a superior principle.  This definition would accommodate contract law's 
background rules using Corbin's distinction between interpretation and construction.  But 
Lieber's further discussion of extravagant construction appears to deny that accommodation by 
limiting legitimate transcendent construction to that which is “within the spirit” of the contract.  
One way to reconcile these points is to insist that by entering into a contract the parties have also 
consented to be bound by the background rules.59 In that way, a judge applying those 
background rules even against the meaning of the parties' expressions may be seen as acting in 
accordance with the spirit or true import of those expressions. 
 
      Understood this way, Lieber argues that the intentions of parties are to be given greatest 
respect in close construction, less respect in comprehensive construction, and least respect in 
transcendent construction.  The applicable species of construction in particular contract disputes 
in turn depends on the source of the need for construction.60 The source of the need for 
                                                 
54 Lieber classified the species of interpretation along analogous lines.  LIEBER, supra note 3, at 
54 - 62 [at 1928-34] (identifying the species of interpretation as close, extensive, predestined, 
and authentic). 
55 Id. at 65 [at 1936] (emphasis added). 
56 Id. (emphasis added). 
57 Id. at 65 - 66 [at 1936] (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at 69 [at 1939]. 
59 See Barnett, supra note 51. 
60 Recall that Lieber identified four circumstances that called for and justified construction.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 11-14.  I am linking those circumstances to Lieber's species of 
construction although he did not do so.  My adaptation is analogous to the point made by 
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construction consists of a combination of external and internal conditions with respect to the 
contingency at issue in a dispute.61  
 
      External conditions are those outside the contractual relationship and text with respect to the 
contingency at issue.  The first of these is the degree of foreseeability.  By this I mean to identify 
a range of probabilities concerning states of the world, defined in terms of transactions costs and 
not in a strictly legal sense.62 One end of the range consists of contingencies which are “actually 
unforeseeable” in some abstract sense, as well as those that are “functionally unforeseeable” -- 
contingencies which are too improbable or of too little magnitude in a given setting to warrant 
the expense of addressing expressly.  The other end of the range consists of contingencies 
sufficiently probable or of sufficiently high magnitude to warrant the expense of addressing 
expressly.  The second external condition is superior principles.  These include the social or 
policy values (such as fairness, certainty, and efficiency) embedded in the background rules of 
contract and other applicable law, as well as the object of contract law in particular to minimize 
the costs of transacting and dispute resolution, as by promoting good drafting and fair 
negotiations. 
 
      Internal conditions are those inside the contractual relationship or text with respect to the 
contingency at issue.  The first of these is the degree to which expressions in the contract address 
the contingency.  The expressions either do not provide for the contingency or insufficiently 
provide for it, by which I mean only that the expressions were not entirely silent concerning it, 
but address it in some imperfect way.63 The second internal condition is the degree of strategic 
behavior by the parties, which can either be absent or, if present, of two kinds.64 Unilateral 
strategic behavior is the withholding by one party of information, the disclosure of which would 
be optimal according to some normative criterion such as efficiency.65 Bilateral strategic 
                                                                                                                                                             
Professors Ayres and Gertner that calls for specifying default rules based on the source of the 
need for them.  See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 92, 127. 
61 A separate table contains a schematic representation of the accompanying discussion.  See 
infra table accompanying note 96. 
62 I note that in this way I am linking high transactions costs and lack of foreseeability as a cause 
of the need for construction.  At lesser levels of generality one might choose to treat them 
separately.  E.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 94 n.34.  At this level of generality I am also 
not taking into account the distinction identified by Professors Ayres and Gertner between 
contingent contract incompleteness and obligational contract incompleteness.  See Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 1. 
63 The divide between “insufficiently provided for” and “unprovided for” will undoubtedly often 
be blurry.  E.g., Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 
470, 470 (N.Y. 1923) (Cardozo, J.) (contract contained formula for determining price but did not 
specify the periods of time during which the price would apply).  Yet that should not undermine 
the value of Lieber's principles of construction. 
64 Lieber did not analyze the role strategic behavior would play in his hermeneutics but on the 
contrary, implicitly assumed that the parties would have comported themselves in good faith.  
See LIEBER, supra note 3, at 110 [at 1969] (“Men who use words, even with the best intent and 
with great care as well as skill ....”). 
65 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 94. 
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behavior is a joint refusal to address some matter and thereby to shift the costs of resolving it 
forward to the subsidized judicial system.66 The third internal condition is the degree to which 
the expressions in the contract text conflict with a superior principle. 
 
A. Close Construction 
 
      Close construction is called for when the gap-revealing contingency could not be foreseen by 
the parties ex ante (as Lieber said, the contract is inadequate to address “cases which human 
wisdom could not foresee”).67 This “unforeseeability” should be taken to include actual 
unforeseeability and functional unforeseeability -- that is, the circumstances do not justify the 
expense of explicitly addressing the contingency.  Lieber's prescription is the “directest possible 
application of the text.”68 It therefore implies a rule tailored to the particular situation of the 
parties, determined as nearly as may be from the text of their contract.  In other words it specifies 
filling gaps according to how the particular parties would have provided for a contingency had it 
been foreseeable, a version of what have lately been called tailored default rules.69 
 
      In close construction a tailored default rule is justified to provide maximal protection of the 
intentions of the parties.  This is because the source of the need for construction is the external 
condition of the contingency's unforeseeability, whether actual or functional, and the internal 
condition of the contingency being unprovided for.  And since there is also an absence of 
strategic behavior, a tailored default rule poses no adverse incentive effects on the negotiating or 
drafting of future contracts. 
 
      Consider a three-year requirements contract for the purchase and sale of coal at a variable 
price tied to a market benchmark.  The buyer is a regulated public utility whose generating 
facility had been operating at an average 60% of capacity for the three years prior to the contract 
and based on historical growth in its existing market could be expected to operate at up to 75% 
of capacity during the contract term.  At the beginning of the contract's second year, the buyer's 
regulator orders the buyer to begin serving an additional geographic market area and solely as a 
result of that regulatory action the buyer's production rises from 60% of its capacity to 90% of its 
capacity.  The regulator had never before taken such a step with respect to any utility under its 
jurisdiction.  The seller refuses to supply the buyer's additional requirements and the buyer sues.  
The gap to be filled by construction is the quantity of coal to be bought and sold under the 
contract.70  
 
                                                 
66 See id. at 93, 96. 
67 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 44 [at 1922].  This is one of the circumstances Lieber identified as 
calling for and justifying the act of construction, see supra text accompanying notes 11-14, 
which I am linking to his hermeneutical scheme, though Lieber did not do so.  See supra note 60 
and accompanying text. 
68 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 65 [at 1936]. 
69 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 89 (noting that “default terms should be set at what the 
parties would have wanted”). 
70 Because the contract sets a variable price based on a market benchmark, it poses no issue as to 
price. 
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      Because the regulator had never before taken such action, the regulatory mandate is an 
external condition that is unforeseeable and it was reasonable for neither party to incur the 
expense of addressing the possibility of expanded capacity being caused by regulatory expansion 
of the buyer's market.  Close construction and a tailored default rule would therefore be 
indicated.  The parties did not contemplate under any circumstance buyer operating at 90% of its 
capacity so the quantity should not be based on that level.  Nor did they contemplate a limit of 
demand based on the buyer operating at 60% of its capacity, however, although the contemplated 
growth of up to 75% of the buyer's operating capacity was based solely on increased demand 
from the buyer's preexisting market.  Although the increase to 90% of capacity has not been 
caused by increased demand in the buyer's preexisting market, since the seller was willing to 
supply coal based on the buyer operating at 75% of its capacity, the source of the increase in 
demand up to that level can reasonably be ignored.  Accordingly, the quantity term under these 
circumstances should be filled in based on the buyer operating at 75% of its capacity. 
 
B. Comprehensive Construction 
 
      Comprehensive construction is called for when the parties might have provided for the gap-
revealing contingency but either left it unprovided for or insufficiently provided for (as Lieber 
said, the contract makes “imperfect provision” for cases “which might have been provided 
for”).71 What “might have been provided for” should be understood to mean contingencies that 
are neither actually unforeseeable nor functionally unforeseeable -- that is, the circumstances 
justify the expense of explicitly addressing the contingency.  Lieber's prescription is an 
“extensive application of the text.”72 It therefore implies permission to depart from the parties' 
particular situation discovered by a close reading of the text. 
 
      In cases where the parties did not sufficiently provide for the gap-revealing contingency, 
comprehensive construction calls for filling gaps based on how most parties would have 
provided for a contingency had they addressed it, what have lately been called majoritarian 
default rules.73 Attenuated protection of the intentions of these particular parties is justified 
because the source of the need for construction is the external condition of foreseeability and the 
internal condition of the contingency being insufficiently provided for.  Since transactions costs 
are not the source of the incompleteness, the default rule should be designed to improve contract 
drafting.74 Yet the insufficient provision at least suggests that the source of the incompleteness is 
not strategic behavior and therefore a default rule the parties would not have wanted is 
unjustified. 
 
                                                 
71 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 44 [at 1921-22] (discussing this concept in terms of politics).  This is 
one of the circumstances Lieber identified as calling for and justifying the act of construction, 
see supra text accompanying notes 11-14, which I am linking to his species of construction, 
though Lieber did not do so.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
72 LIEBER, supra note 3, at 65 [at 1936]. 
73 See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1, 4 -5 (1993). 
74 To the extent that these particular parties would in any event have selected the majoritarian 
default, consideration could be given to a penalty default, as described in the succeeding text. 
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      Such a so-called penalty default would be indicated, however, in a case where the parties 
might have provided for the contingency but did not do so at all.75 The absence of even an 
insufficient provision in such a case suggests the possibility of strategic behavior on the part of at 
least one party.76 Therefore, consideration should be given to a penalty default designed to 
induce parties to reveal information.77 If the evidence shows bilateral strategic behavior -- for 
example, where each party deferred providing for the contingency to reduce costs by resort to ex 
post litigation -- then the bilateral penalty default of nonenforcement is appropriate.  On the other 
hand, if the evidence shows unilateral strategic behavior -- for example, where one party has 
withheld information the disclosure of which would have been optimal (for efficiency or other 
reasons) -- then a unilateral penalty default is appropriate. 
 
      Consider the example of a requirements contract for coal referred to above except now 
assume that the regulator had, during the previous three years, been redefining territories served 
by the various utilities under its jurisdiction.  Changes in the buyer's requirements based on 
regulatory interference was therefore foreseeable and the parties should have addressed this 
contingency expressly but instead left it unprovided for.  If both parties were equally aware of 
that contingency then this should be seen as bilateral strategic behavior justifying a bilateral 
penalty default.  The agreement should therefore be treated as if it fails to specify a quantity term 
with sufficient definiteness and the quantity term set, in effect, equal to zero.78  
 
      On the other hand, if only one party had been acting strategically, then a unilateral penalty 
default against that party would be appropriate.  If the buyer had private access to the 
information concerning the public utility's oversight posture but failed to disclose this 
information to the seller, for example, then the contract should be enforced based on the buyer's 
requirements given its historical operating levels and without regard to the expected growth rate 
of its preexisting market.  The quantity should therefore be set based on the buyer operating at 
60% of its capacity.79  
 
      If instead of not providing for fluctuations in the buyer's requirements at all, the contract 
contained general language addressing fluctuations -- for example if the contract provided for 
                                                 
75 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 91 (a penalty default is one “designed to give at least 
one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose 
affirmatively the contract provision they prefer”). 
76 The absence of an insufficient provision suggests this possibility but is not conclusive.  The 
omission may be utterly inadvertent, and if so, would not necessarily justify a penalty default. 
77 Other factors to consider in weighing the appropriateness of a penalty default rule include “the 
likelihood that the penalty will in fact result in information being revealed, the benefit (in more 
efficient reliance or precaution) of the revealed information, and the costs of explicitly 
contracting around the default.”  Id. at 128.  If such factors imply that a penalty default is not 
justified in this context, then comprehensive construction would still be appropriate but would 
lead to a majoritarian default rule. 
78 From an ex ante perspective, this gives both parties seeking to enter into the requirements 
contract an incentive to negotiate and provide for the foreseeable contingency. 
79 From an ex ante perspective, this gives the party with private information an incentive to 
reveal the information and to permit negotiation and provision with respect to it. 
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increases in the buyer's requirements based on expanded capacity to meet increased demand but 
did not specify the applicable market -- then the regulatory expansion of the buyer's geographic 
market is a contingency insufficiently provided for and a majoritarian default rule would apply.  
The issue is how most parties entering into a requirements contract in a regulated environment 
would have treated a regulated expansion in the buyer's geographic market.  The judge would 
look to industry practice in choosing the majoritarian default rule.  If the practice was to base 
requirements on the capacity dictated by both natural growth in demand in the buyer's 
preexisting market as well demand from the new market created by the regulator, for example, 
the quantity should be set based on the buyer operating at 90% of its capacity. 
 
      If the judge in the interpretive process decides that the parties' expressions address the 
dispute but do so in a contradictory way, the applicable principles of construction depend on 
whether or not either party had a duty to make disclosure or provide clarification with respect to 
the contingency as to which there is a contradiction.  If either party had such a duty, then the 
contradiction should be considered strategic.  As such, comprehensive construction applies and 
calls for a unilateral penalty default against that party.  This is similar to the doctrine of contra 
proferentum and means in this context that the contradiction is resolved against the interests of 
the duty-bound party to discourage strategic behavior and provide incentives for proper 
drafting.80 If neither party had any such duty, then the contradiction should be considered 
nonstrategic.  To the extent that the contradiction reveals that the contingency was foreseen, 
however, comprehensive construction still applies.  But, because of the absence of strategic 
behavior, it leads to a majoritarian default rule.81  
 
      Consider again the coal requirements contract referred to above.  Since requirements 
contracts are generally enforceable with respect to such quantities as the buyer in its usual course 
of business would need, then to the extent that the buyer has private information with respect to 
those needs it has a duty to make clarification with respect to what those needs are expected to 
be.82 If the contract contains contradictions with respect to those expected needs -- for example if 
the contract defined the buyer's historical requirements based on operating at 60% of its capacity 
but also contained a formula yielding requirements based on operating at 75% of its capacity -- 
then this should be considered a strategic contradiction and calls for a unilateral penalty default 
against the buyer.  The quantity would therefore be set based on the buyer operating at 60% of its 
capacity. 
 
      If the information about growth rates in the buyer's preexisting market was equally 
accessible, however -- for example if it was publicly available -- then the buyer should not be 
seen to have a duty to make clarification with respect to its expected requirements and the 
contradiction should be considered nonstrategic.  A majoritarian default rule should therefore 
                                                 
80 Cf. Charny, supra note 51, at 1854 -55 (noting the significance of whether the drafting party 
had a duty of disclosure in the context of the doctrine of contra proferentum). 
81 Note that under the external condition of the foreseeable, the internal condition of nonstrategic 
contradiction yields the same analysis and result as the internal condition of insufficiently 
provided for -- comprehensive construction and a majoritarian default rule.  See infra table 
accompanying note 96. 
82 See Utah Int’l Inc. v. Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass’n, 425 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1976).  
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apply by appealing to prevailing industry practice.  As noted above, if the practice was to base 
requirements on the capacity dictated by both natural growth in demand in the buyer's 
preexisting market as well demand from the new market created by the regulator, the quantity 
should be set based on the buyer operating at 90% of its capacity. 
 
C. Transcendent Construction 
 
      In cases where the parties' expressions address the dispute and are free from contradiction, 
the judge must decide in the act of construction whether the meaning of the expressions as 
interpreted are to be enforced in accordance with that meaning or whether they may not be so 
enforced.  In the former case the construction of the contract is consistent with the interpretation 
of the contract, and this amounts to pure Lieberian interpretation.  In the latter case, the 
construction of the contract denies legal effect to the meaning of the expressions as determined 
in the act of interpretation of the contract.  The judge is engaging in Lieberian transcendent 
construction and defines an unalterable background rule, what have lately been called immutable 
rules.83  
 
      Transcendent construction is called for when a superior principle conflicts with the parties' 
expressions.  By permitting appeal to a “principle superior to the text,” Lieber acknowledges the 
existence of immutable rules.84 Superior principles in contract law are all those background rules 
that may not be altered by expression of the parties.85 Determining whether a background 
contract rule may be altered by the parties depends on the extent to which the rule is necessary to 
implement a fundamental purpose of contract law.  For example, the principal purpose of 
contract law is to promote the realization of the reasonable expectations of contracting parties.86 
To implement this purpose requires a rule prohibiting a party from taking action unnecessary to 
realizing its reasonable expectations that impairs a counterparty's reasonable expectations.  This 
rule is recognized as the obligation of good faith performance that is a part of all contracts.87  
 
      Courts often speak of the obligation of good faith performance in contracts as an “implied 
covenant,” suggesting that it is deduced by an interpretation of the parties' expressions.  From 
that conception, some courts are led to conclude that it may be modified or waived by the 
parties,88 though most contracts theorists hold that it may not.89 And according to the method for 
                                                 
83 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 87. 
84 But cf. supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
85 See supra note 44.  For a more specific discussion of immutable rules defined along a 
continuum between default rules and immutable rules positioned in the context of producing 
separating equilibria rather than pooling equilibria, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 119 -
27. 
86 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS s 1.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993). 
87 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (citing Kirk La-Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co. 188 N.E. 163 
(N.Y. 1933); Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 614 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.); 
Parev Prods. Co. v. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941) (Clark, J.)). 
88 See 3A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS s 654A, at 88 - 89 (Lawrence A. 
Cunningham & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., Supp. 1994) (citing and criticizing Chemical Bank v. 
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determining whether a background rule may be altered just stated, once one understands the 
close connection between contract law's principal purpose and the good faith obligation, that 
obligation must be seen as a rule designed to implement that purpose.  As a rule dedicated to 
determining the legal operation of the parties' expressions, therefore, in Corbin's terms it is a 
question of construction, not of interpretation;90 in Lieber's terms, it is a superior principle; in 
contemporary terms, it is an immutable rule.91 For that reason, courts that have decided that the 
covenant may be waived or modified both misunderstand Corbin's distinction between 
interpretation and construction and fail to recognize Lieber's hoary insight concerning superior 
principles.92  
 
      When a text is found to conflict with a superior principle so identified, the question is how to 
treat that conflict.  In what manner should the superior principle displace the expressions in 
conflict with it?  The analysis here is analogous to that in the context of comprehensive 
construction of expressions accompanied by strategic behavior.93 If a disclaimer of the good faith 
obligation runs one way, then it should be considered unilateral strategic behavior and a 
unilateral penalty default should be imposed.  If a disclaimer of the good faith obligation runs 
both ways, then it should be considered bilateral strategic behavior and a bilateral penalty default 
of nonenforcement of the contract should be imposed. 
 
      Reconsider the coal requirements contract referred to above.  Assume that it contains a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Paul, 614 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dioguardi Jeep Eagle, Inc., 
596 N.Y.S.2d 230 (App. Div. 1993); McKenzie v. Pacific Health & Life Ins. Co., 847 P.2d 879 
(Or. Ct. App. 1993)). 
89 See, e.g., Burton, supra note 51, at 131 n.43 (noting that “the covenant of good faith may not 
be disclaimed by agreement of the parties” mainly because “a contract clause disclaiming any 
obligation to keep a promise would be a contradiction in terms”). 
90 See CORBIN, supra note 88, s 654A, at 88. 
91 One would be led to a very different conception of good faith if one settles on a different 
primary mission for contract law.  For example, Judge Posner believes that the main purpose of 
contract law is to facilitate exchange in the face of vulnerabilities to which sequential 
performance gives rise.  See RICHARD A. POSNER , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81 (4th ed. 
1991).  Under that mission, good faith merely means the absence of bad faith, or the absence of 
opportunistic behavior by the parties.  See id.  For a critique of this point of view and a 
comparison of it with the traditional view, articulated by Cardozo, see Cunningham, supra note 
87. 
92 Corbin's distinction is most often explicitly used by courts only in the context of distinguishing 
between questions of fact and questions of law.  See, e.g., John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. Waldinger 
Corp., 796 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1986); Ram Constr. Co., Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 
1049 (3d Cir. 1984).  While important for defining the proper scope of appellate review and for 
allocating power between trier of fact and trier of law, that limited usage falls far short of 
exploiting the full power of Corbin's distinction. 
93 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 125 -26.  Professors Ayres and Gertner note that the 
situations are analogous, although in the earlier case the goal is to eliminate gaps (to avoid the 
need to construct default rules) and in this case the goal is to promote gaps (to avoid the need of 
displacing expressions that conflict with superior principles). 
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provision defining the good faith requirements of the buyer based on something other than the 
buyer's expected requirements given various historical and projected economic and regulatory 
environments.  In other words, the provision purports to permit the buyer to demand quantities 
unbounded either by its historical operations at 60% of its capacity, its expected operations at 
75% of its capacity, or its regulator-induced operations at 90% of its capacity.  Such a provision 
conflicts with the good faith obligation because it attempts to alter that rule's insistence on 
mutual respect for the reasonable expectations of the parties.  And since the provision runs one 
way, a unilateral penalty default should be imposed -- the contract should be enforced and the 
quantity set based on the buyer operating at 60% of its capacity.  If the contract also contained a 
provision purporting to limit the seller's good faith to something more narrow than acting in 
accordance with the mutual reasonable expectations of the parties -- for example by permitting 
the seller to decline to meet the buyer's needs if other customers demand all the seller's 
production in a particular period -- then the conflict should be seen as bilateral and a bilateral 
penalty default of nonenforcement of the contract should be imposed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
      The foregoing discussion of Lieber's hermeneutics -- adapted for contract law according to 
Corbin's distinction between interpretation and construction -- is tentative and general.  It is 
intended to recognize a potential intellectual debt owed to Lieber, who has been a neglected 
figure in contemporary American legal thought even in those fields in which he was at one time 
regarded as the avatar.  In addition to hermeneutics, of which he has been called the high priest, 
these include the law of war, constitutional and political theory, and philosophies of education.94 
Lieber's potential contributions to the law of contracts have been ignored, thanks to Corbin's 
dismissal of his distinction between interpretation and construction and neglect of his principles 
of construction. 
 
      Yet while Corbin has been treated as the legal academy's equivalent of royalty, even his 
distinction between interpretation and construction has been underappreciated.  So this Essay is 
also an acknowledgement of an additional intellectual debt owed to him.  And while the limited 
space allocated for this Essay makes it impossible to explore the much deeper and richer insights 
that Lieber's hermeneutics offer contract law, I hope that it will lead contracts scholars who have 
participated in or followed the default rules debate to give Lieber a read.95  
                                                 
94 See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political 
Ethics of Francis Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339, 352- 98 (1992). 
95 I do have space to mention personal debts to Lieber and Corbin.  Lieber wrote the 
“Constitution and Plan for Girard College,” the great boarding school-orphanage I attended 
which was founded according to the will of Stephen Girard for the education of “poor male white 
orphan children” and has been educating young people since 1848 according to Lieber's 
ingenious philosophy of education.  See CHEESMAN A. HERRICK, HISTORY OF GIRARD COLLEGE 
182 (1935); see also Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of 
Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957) (reviewing the “Girard College” case, the Supreme 
Court's articulation of the cy pres doctrine holding that Girard College could not discriminate 
against applicants for admission on the basis of race).  As for Corbin, my personal debt is more 
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Lieber's Principles of Construction and Default Rules96  
 
Species of 
Construction 
      External 
Conditions 
 
 
      Internal 
Conditions 
 
 
      Form of Default 
Rule 
 
 
Close        Unforeseeable 
    [Quiet Reg.] 
 
      Unprovided 
 
 
      Tailored 
              [Q=75] 
 
        Insufficiently 
Provided 
 
      Majoritarian 
[Q=90] 
 
        Unprovided 
 
      Penalty (Bi, Uni) 
[Q=0, 60] 
 
Comprehensive       Foreseeable 
[Active Reg.] 
 
  
        Strategic 
Contradiction  
 
      Unilateral 
Penalty [Q=60] 
 
       Nonstrategic 
Contradiction  
 
      Majoritarian 
[Q=90] 
 
Transcendent        Superior 
Principle 
 
      Conflict 
 
 
      Penalty (Bi, Uni) 
[Q=0, 60] 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
modest but more directly lucrative, for I have had the privilege since 1994 of serving as an editor 
of his magisterial treatise on the law of contracts. 
96 As with the text to which this chart relates, supra text accompanying notes 67- 93, this 
schematic offers one possible understanding of the relationship between Lieber's principles of 
construction and general aspects of prevailing default rules discourse.  See also supra note 50 
and accompanying text.  The bracketed entries in this table reflect the hypothetical requirements 
contract discussed in the text: “Quiet Reg” denotes the circumstance in which the regulator had 
never previously redefined a utility's geographic market; “Active Reg” denotes the circumstance 
in which the regulator had been doing so actively; and the “Q=” denotes how the quantity term 
should be set based on percentage levels of buyer's operating capacity. 
